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DENIAL OF LAND USE TO NEW NUCLEAR
POWERPLANTS IN CALIFORNIA:
A CASE OF PREEMPTION?
INTRODUCTION

Since the establishment of a federalist government two
centuries ago the issue of federal preemption of an area of law
has remained a chronic and often difficult constitutional issue
for this nation's courts. The growing controversy over nuclear
powerplants lends a new context, and perhaps higher stakes,
to the traditional struggle between federal and state attempts
to regulate the same subject matter. At issue is a state's power
to regulate or ban nuclear powerplants within its boundaries.
In the aftermath of research and debate concerning the safety
of nuclear powerplants, many states have augmented federal
regulation with more stringent statutes of their own. Despite
their focus on public safety, the state regulations may face
invalidation under the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution.'
One state which has enacted its own regulations is California. In the spring of 1976, Californians were bombarded with
media propaganda on nuclear powerplants and their future use
in California. Controversy centered on Proposition 15, an initiative which would have phased out nuclear power in the state
unless certain conditions were met.2 Meanwhile, the California
Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use and Energy,
after extensive hearings, reached a consensus that the use of
nuclear power had to be reassessed by the state. The committee, chaired by Assemblyman Charles Warren, approved four
bills dealing with nuclear energy. These bills were considered
more moderate alternatives to Proposition 15. Of the four bills,
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2. Proposition 15 would have added a title 7.8, the Land Use and Nuclear Power
Liability and Safeguards Act, to the California Government Code. See CALIFORNIA
STATE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES, LAND USE AND ENERGY, REASSESSMENT OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA-A POLICY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 15 AND ITS

(1976) [hereinafter cited as REASSESSMENT REPORT]. Under the proposition, the future existence of nuclear power within the state would have been made
dependent upon the assurance of full compensation to all victims of any potential
nuclear incident, and upon legislative findings by a two-thirds vote that all safety
systems are effective and that radioactive wastes can be permanently and safely stored
for centuries. See id. at 159-60. See also Carter, Nuclear Initiative: Impending Vote
Stimulates Legislative Action, 192 SCIENCE 975, 976 (1976).
ALTERNATIVES
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three were signed into law before the vote on the initiative. 3
Since Proposition 15 failed, these bills survive as the California
regulatory scheme governing nuclear powerplants.
This comment examines the provisions of the three California statutes, Public Resources Code sections 25524.125524.3, and explores the question of whether they are
preempted by federal regulatory legislation dealing with nuclear power. In considering this question, it examines the present federal regulatory scheme, various forms of state regulation
including the California statutes, and the preemption doctrine
as developed by the United States Supreme Court. Following
this examination, the author explores the arguments for and
against preemption and concludes that the nuclear expertise
possessed by an individual state may be the governing factor
in determining whether its regulatory efforts are preempted.
FEDERAL REGULATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Background
Federal concern over the control of nuclear energy dates
back to World War II. At that time nuclear research was directed at the development of the atomic bomb in the
"Manhattan Project."' After the war, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 19465 which authorized the creation of the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) whose members were to
exercise control over the spread of nuclear power.' In 1954,
Congress amended the Act to permit private ownership of nuclear reactors through a licensing system under the auspices
of the AEC.' Pursuant to the amendments, the AEC was given
the contradictory tasks of both promoting the research and
3. The bills were A.B. 2820, dealing with adequate fuel reprocessing capacity;
A.B. 2821, dealing with undergrounding of reactors; A.B. 2822, dealing with permanent
waste disposal; and A.B. 2823, dealing with fuel accident liability. All but A.B. 2823
were passed and signed by Governor Brown on June 3, 1976. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE,
ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY,

1975-76, at 1502-03.

4. The Manhattan Project was a monumental effort to develop the atom bomb
before any other country, particularly Hitler's Germany. The odds were heavily against
the success of the project. One of the biggest obstacles was that there was no then
existing method of producing explosive material in any significant quantity. For thorough coverage of this project and its political and human dimensions, see S. GROUEFF,
THE MANHATTAN PROJECT (1967); L. LAMONT, DAY OF TRINrrY (1965).
5. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1947) (current version
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
6. Id.
7. See The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (1955) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
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development of nuclear energy and of regulating and licensing
it.,
These contradictory roles were criticized as contributing to
ineffective regulation.' To remedy this inherent conflict of interest and promote more effective regulation, Congress passed
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.10 This legislation abolished the Atomic Energy Commission and established two federal agencies to replace it. The first, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), took over the AEC's regulatory and licensing functions." The second, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), assumed the AEC's research
and development responsibilities.
Federal-StateInteraction: 1959 Amendments
The only federal legislation attempting to define the respective roles of the federal and state governments in the regulation of nuclear energy is the 1959 amendments to the Atomic
Energy Act. 2 Only four subsections of the complex amendments are cited with any frequency in relation to the issue of
federal preemption: section 274(a), section 274(b), section
274(c), and section 274(k).' 3 Section 274(a) sets forth the following purposes of the amendments: "to establish coordination
between state and federal governments and to provide for the
8. The two roles of the AEC, promotion and regulation, were contradictory because effective regulation sometimes requires refusal to approve projects, adoption of
safeguards which delay and increase the costs of projects, and postponement or cancellation of projects. These regulatory decisions necessarily slow down the development
and promotion of nuclear energy.
9. See generally C. OLSON, UNACCEPTABLE RISKS, THE NUCLEAR POWER
CONTROVERSY

(1976); J.W.

GOFMAN

& A.R.

TAMPLIN, POISONED POWER

(1971).

10. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233
(amended 1975, 1976) (current version codified in scattered sections of 5, 42 U.S.C.).
The intent of Congess to end the inherent conflict of interest within the AEC is
stated in the Act itself:
Congressional declaration of policy and purpose.
(c) The Congress finds that it is in the public interest that the licensing
and related regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission be
separated from the performance of the other functions of the Commission
42 U.S.C. § 5801 (c) (Supp. V 1975).
11. See generally Note, Legal Considerationsin Nuclear Power Plant Siting in
Light of the Energy ReorganizationAct of 1974, 10 NEW ENGLAND L. REv. 305 (1975).
12. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 2021 (1970).
13. See id. § 2021(a)-(c), (k) (Supp. V 1975).
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orderly transfer of some of the regulatory authority of the AEC
to the states."' 4
Section 274(b) authorizes the AEC to turn over some of its
powers to the states. 5 This transfer of duties can be accomplished only through an agreement between the AEC and the
governors of individual states as a state achieves the expertise
and capacity to effectively and safely regulate those nuclear
activities covered by the agreement. Thus, the AEC retains
jurisdiction in states which do not have either the interest or
the technical capacity to undertake regulation.
Section 274(c) prohibits the AEC from entering into an
agreement in which the AEC surrenders to the state its authority to regulate specified nuclear activities. The activities listed
are the construction and operation of any nuclear powerplant,
the export or import of nuclear materials, the disposal of nuclear materials into the ocean, and the disposal of any other
nuclear materials which the AEC determines are too hazardous
to be left to the limited expertise of the states. 7 The impact of
this section cannot be overlooked since it includes the construction and operation of nuclear powerplants among the activities
which cannot be the subject of an agreement between the AEC
and a state.
Finally, section 274(k) is important not for what it says,
but for what it implies. The section reads as follows: "Nothing
in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any
state or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other
8 The key language
than protection againstradiationhazards.""
14. Id. § 2021(a).
15. Id. § 2021(b). Section 2021(b) provides in partl.
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the Commission is
authorized to enter into agreements with the Governor of any State providing for discontinuance of the regulatory authority of the Commission
under subchapters V, VI, and VII of this chapter, and section 2021 of this
title, with respect to any one or more of the following materials within
the State-(I) byproduct materials; (2) source materials; (3) special nuclear materials in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass. During
the duration of such an agreement it is recognized that the State shall
have authority to regulate the materials covered by the agreement for the
protection of the public health and safety from radiation hazards.
16. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1970) reads in part:
No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall
provide for discontinuance of any authority and the Commission shall
retain authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of- (1) the
construction and operation of any production or utilization facility.
18. Id. § 2021(k) (emphasis added).
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is that portion permitting states to regulate for purposes other
than protection against radiation hazards, strongly implying
that states may not regulate for protection against radiation
hazards.
The language of the federal regulatory framework clearly
contemplates some kind of national control over nuclear energy. The language also envisions a partial transfer of this regulatory authority to the states in certain specified areas. If any
state statutes are to be upheld they must regulate within the
limited transfer language of the 1959 amendments or be reconciled with the broad language of the energy acts which imply
federal control over the proliferation of nuclear energy.
STATE REGULATORY EFFORTS

Several states, in addition to California, have considered
legislation which would regulate or ban nuclear energy within
their boundaries. For example, in 1975, Vermont adopted a
measure which requires a state licensing agency to receive the
approval of both houses of the legislature before issuing a certificate for the construction of a nuclear powerplant. 1 Similarly, other states have considered various moratoriums on
nuclear power.2"
The Oregon Approach
Oregon is among the states which have
adopted a comprehensive statutory scheme for the regulation of nuclear power.2 '
The legislature created a state department of energy which is
responsible for studying and estimating Oregon's energy resources and needs,2 2 and the Energy Facility and Siting Council
(EFSC) to regulate the state's powerplants, including nuclear
powerplants. The EFSC is authorized to inspect nuclear powerplants during construction and operation; to set safety standards pertaining to radiation emissions, disposal of radioactive
19. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248(c)(Cum. Supp. 1977) provides in part:
Before a certificate of public good is issued for the construction of a
nuclear fission plant the public service board shall obtain the approval
of the general assembly and the assembly's determination that the construction of the proposed facility will promote the general welfare.
20. For a thorough discussion of various bills and statutes, see Murphy & La
Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the Supremacy Clause:
A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 392, 420-33 (1976).
21. Id. at 421-24.
22. Id. at 421.
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wastes, and other plant functions; and to provide the director
of the department of energy with information on the various
generating plants. 3 Based on information supplied by EFSC,
the director of the department of energy is empowered to reduce or curtail the operation of nuclear powerplants which the
director finds to be hazardous or likely to violate safety regulations.2"
The CaliforniaApproach
Prior to the passage of the three new statutes, California
had established the State Energy Resources Conservation and
Development Commission (ERCDC). 5 The duties of the
ERCDC included forecasting the state's energy needs, providing research and development, encouraging energy insulation,
and certifying powerplant sites. The newly enacted statutes,
California Public Resources Code sections 25524.1-25524.3,
alter the responsibilities of the ERCDC concerning powerplant
sites. They accomplish this by controlling the disposal and
reprocessing of radioactive waste as well as mandating safeguards to protect against the escape of radiation into the atmosphere.
Section 25524.1 prohibits the ERCDC from granting land
use to any nuclear powerplant until the technology exists for
construction and operation of nuclear fuel rod reprocessing
plants. 6 However, the determination of whether such technol23. Id. at 421-22.
24. Id. at 422-23.
25. See Warren-Alquist Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act,
§ 2 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25200 (West 1977). The creation of ERCDC was the culmination of a number of social, economic and environmental forces in the State of California
over the previous 10 to 15 years. Energy consumption in the state was rising at an
annual rate of 7 to 8%. Meanwhile, nuclear powerplants, which many saw as the
solution, became embroiled in controversy, government bureacracy and delays. Over
30 permits from federal, state and local agencies were required before construction of
a nuclear powerplant could begin. In 1965, the State Power Plant Siting Committee
was established to formulate uniform guidelines on powerplant sitings. However, the
number of permits required continued to increase. ERCDC was finally created to
streamline the permit procedure. CALIFORNIA ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, 7 CALIFORNIA ENERGY TRENDS AND CHoicEs

2-3 (1977).

26. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.1 (West Supp. 1977).
Nuclear powerplants convert radioactive fuel into radioactive waste. The reprocessing plants would convert some of this radioactive waste back into nuclear fuel.
However, great difficulty has been encountered in creating a commercially practical
reprocessing plant. While several have been constructed, they have encountered a
litany of problems. Currently, there is no viable reprocessing plant in commercial
operation. Since the used fuel cannot be reprocessed, it is being stored, but storage
space is becoming scarce. See C. OLSON, supra note 9, at 155-60.
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ogy does in fact exist, is not left to the independent judgment
of the ERCDC. The statute provides that the ERCDC must
find that "the United States through its authorized agency has
identified and approved and there exists a technology for the
construction and operation of nuclear reprocessing plants." 7
After the ERCDC has reported its findings to the legislature,
then either house has one hundred days to pass a resolution
rejecting the findings of the ERCDC. If no resolution has been
passed within that time, the ERCDC may proceed to certify
nuclear powerplants.
In this fashion, the legislature acts as a potential check on
the findings of ERCDC. If one house rejects the ERCDC findings, it must state the reasons for the rejection and the steps
necessary to conform the findings to the statute. If the ERCDC,
upon reexamination, concludes that its findings are adequate,
then the legislature (both houses) has one hundred days to act
or the ERCDC may begin certifying nuclear power plants. 8
After the ERCDC has made the necessary findings and
neither legislative house has rejected them within the required
time, the ERCDC must review its findings on a case-by-case
basis. Before certifying any individual nuclear powerplant, the
ERCDC must find that there exists, or will exist when actually
needed, sufficient fuel reprocessing capacity or adequate fuel
storage capacity.29 This case-by-case determination is not reviewed by the legislature.
Section 25524.2 prohibits the ERCDC from granting land
use to any nuclear powerplant until the ERCDC has determined that technology exists for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste. 0 This does not mean that the process for disposal
CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 25524.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
28. Id. § 25524.1(a)(2).
29. Id. § 25524.1(b).
30. Id. § 25524.2.
Nuclear powerplants use radioactive materials, such as Uranium 235, as fuel.
These radioactive materials give off heat as they undergo nuclear reactions. This heat
is used to boil water into steam, which in turn is, by a number of means, used to
operate an electrical generator. Over time, these radioactive materials convert themselves into other kinds of radioactive materials and are no longer useful for electric
power generation. These other kinds of radioactive materials are nuclear waste. Some
of these materials which are particularly dangerous are classified as high-level waste.
Although not useable for fuel, they are extremely radioactive and dangerous. These
wastes may soon be able to be partially reprocessed into useable fuel. However, some
waste materials will have to be permanently stored for centuries. As of yet, there is no
solution to the problem of how to safely and permanently dispose of these wastes. See
C. OLSON, supra note 9, at 160-65.

27.
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must be in actual operation, but only that the technology exists
for such an operation. The procedure for determining whether
such technology exists is the same as provided by section
25524.1. That is, the ERCDC looks to the federal agency for
confirmation of the existence of such disposal technology, and
reports its findings to the legislature. However, under section
25524.2 there is no case-by-case determination requirement.3
Section 25524.3 provides that the ERCDC shall not grant
land use to a nuclear powerplant until it completes a preliminary investigation into the necessity, effectiveness, and economic feasibility of "undergrounding and berm containment"
of nuclear reactors. 2 The ERCDC is to hold public hearings
during the course of its investigation and present recommendations to the legislature based on its findings. After submitting
its recommendations, the ERCDC is prohibited from granting
land use for nuclear powerplants until the legislature has had
one year to study its proposals.3
Although the coverage of the newly enacted statutes is
comprehensive in the areas they regulate, the California regulatory approach is somewhat limited in scope. The statutes do
not address the issue of liability in the case of accident. 4 Addi31. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (West Supp. 1977).
32. Id. § 25524.3.
The California Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use and Energy defined
"berm containment" as placement of powerplant components in a scooped out hole
and backfilling over all the structures with removed dirt. REASSESSMENT REPORT, supra
note 2, at 56.
33. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.3 (West Supp. 1977).
34. Proposition 15, § 67503, reprintedin REASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at
159-60 app. The federal liability provisions are found in the Anderson-Price Act, Act
of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (amending Atomic Energy Act of
1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919) (Current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975)). Under the Act, utilities are required to maintain $125 million in private
insurance. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (Supp. V 1975); 10 C.F.R. 140.11 (1977). The amendment also limits the power company's liability for any nuclear accident to $560 million.
42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (Supp. V 1975). Finally, the federal government is obligated to pay
damages not covered by private insurance, up to the maximum liability limit of $560
million. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (Supp. V 1975).
The liability provisions have been the subject of much controversy. Proponents
maintained the regulations were necessary if nuclear power was to become commercially practical. Opponents have argued that by limiting total liability to $560 million,
the provisions do not adequately protect the public. C. OLSON, supra note 9, at 55-56.
Resolution of this controversy may be forthcoming since a challenge to the constitutionality of the $560 million liability limitation is now pending before the United States
Supreme Court. See Carolina Envt'l Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1977), prob. juris. noted sub nom., United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, 46 U.S.L.W. 3306
(Nov. 8, 1977) (No. 77-375).
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tionally, only new construction is affected by the statutes,
while existing facilities are apparently left unregulated. Further, the statutes make no attempt to deal with reactor safety.
Section 25524.3 does require a study of the feasibility of undergrounding and berm containment of nuclear powerplants.
However, it does not require the study of safety systems used
in existing nuclear powerplants. Finally, the safety of radioactive waste disposal is also left untouched by the sections. The
language of section 25524.2 requires only that technology exist
for disposal; there is no requirement that the technology be
safe. However, it is possible that safety may have to be considered nevertheless. It can be argued that an obviously unsafe
method of disposal is no method at all.
Notwithstanding the narrowness of the statutory coverage,
the California legislature still purports to regulate in an area
ostensibly left to federal control-nuclear power. Thus, the
California regulatory effort gives rise to a classic preemption
problem. Since the fate of the legislation hangs on the resolution of this problem, it becomes important to examine the conceptual underpinnings of the doctrine of preemption.
PREEMPTION

Express Preemption
The doctrine of preemption arises out of the supremacy
clause of article VI, section 2 of the United States Constitution,
which reads as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding. 5
The Supreme Court first confronted a preemption issue in
McCulloch v. Maryland." In resolving the issue, Chief Justice
Marshall stated simply that federal law within its field of authority is supreme.37 Problems have not arisen from disagreement with that basic principle. It is well understood that if a
35.
36.
37.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id. at 405.
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federal law and a state law conflict such that it is impossible
to obey both, the state law must give way. However, numerous
controversies have arisen in trying to decide when a state law
so conflicts with a federal provision that it should be struck
down. 8 In certain instances, Congress will plainly preempt an
area of law by inserting a preemption clause in a statute. In
other instances, there will clearly be a direct conflict between
a state and federal law. In either case, there is express preemption, and the state law must give way.
Implied Preemption-TraditionalCriteria
Generally, it is not clear what impact Congress intends its
legislation to have on a given area." g In most cases, if states also
regulate in that area, courts are left to consider" a variety of
factors in assessing whether Congress impliedly intended to
preempt a particular field." In making this assessment, courts
commonly examine the legislative history, as expressed in debates and committee reports, to determine if any intent existed
which was not expressed in the statute. Alternatively, the
courts may study an act itself to see if preemption may be
implied from the wording. 2 If Congress has provided detailed
38.

See generally D.

ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER

317-45 (1974).

39. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 515,
542-43; Comment, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of
Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208, 209 (1959). See also D. ENODAHL, supra note 38,
at 322.
However, this is not to say that it is unusual for Congress to expressly specify its
intent in regard to preemption. As part of the federal statutes protecting employees
whose wages are garnished by creditors from dismissal by employers, Congress inserted
a provision specifically not preempting state laws which offer the employee greater
protection, provided they were approved as such by the Secretary of Labor. See 15
U.S.C. § 1965 (Supp. IV 1974). Also, the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Warranty Act,
§§ 2301-2312 id., has explicit provisions regarding preemption. Id. § 2311.
40. An example of a factor which may be considered is the legislative history of
the federal legislation. Sometimes this will indicate either that Congress intended to
preempt state laws or that Congress had an objective which is frustrated by the state
law. In either case, preemption will be implied and the state regulation will be invalidated under the supremacy clause. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
41. See D. ENGDAHL, supra note 38, at 317-45. The Supreme Court has preempted
state law in numerous cases without finding any direct conflict between federal and
state law. For example, on occasion, the Court has held that the need for uniform laws
on a subject of national character is sufficient to preempt state law. See City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Preemption has also been found by the Court
where the state law in question would frustrate the accomplishment of the full purposes of the federal legislation. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
229 (1964); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
42. D. ENGDAHL, supra note 38, at 332-39. Congress sometimes does express an
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regulation in an area, this gives rise to an inference that it
intended to dominate the field.43 The need for uniform laws
governing a multistate activity may also be given consideration.44 Further, courts may find a state law preempted because
it interferes with the purpose of the federal law, a purpose
stated expressly in the act or deduced from the legislative history.45 Finally, some deference might be given to the opinion of
an administrative agency created to enforce a particular enactment .
However, short of an express statement by Congress of
intent to preempt, no one factor will be determinative. As Justice Douglas noted in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal: "Our cases on preemption are not precise guidelines
in the present controversy, for each case turns on the peculiarities and special features of the federal regulatory scheme in
question." 47 Therefore, it is always important to consider the
facts of each case.
intent on preemption. In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624
(1973), the Court found that language in the Federal Aviation Act did not expressly
preempt state laws limiting the hours during which jet aircraft could take off from
airports. However, because the Act did expressly preempt state laws governing flying
aircraft, in order to give effect to the congressional purposes in passing the Act, the
Supreme Court felt compelled to preempt state laws which, by regulating airports,
interfere with airspace management.
43. Among the areas which the Supreme Court has decided were fully occupied
by congressional regulation to the exclusion of state regulation are the following: aircraft noise (City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973));
certain aspects of railroad labor disputes (Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969));' trading with Indians on reservations
(Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965)); domestic
espionage (Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956)); certain warehouses (Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
44. In Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 167 (1942), the court
stated that the manufacture and distribution of renovated butter, already federally
regulated, does not permit state regulation because of the multistate nature of the
butter industry.
45. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). In Perez, Arizona law provided
for revocation of one's driver's license if an individual were involved in a motor vehicle
accident and did not have insurance. The statute so provided even if the individual
later received a discharge of the debt stemming from the accident in federal bankruptcy proceedings. This law was determined to interfere with a major purpose of the
bankruptcy act, namely to give the bankrupt a fresh start. See also Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941).
46. See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 532-33
(1959). In Farmers, the Federal Communications Commission's opinion on preemption was an important factor in the Court's holding that aspects of North Dakota's
defamation law were preempted.
47. 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973).
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Traditional CriteriaApplied
In recent decisions," a the Supreme Court has demanded a
strong showing of congressional preemptive intent before forcing a state regulatory scheme to give way." In fact, the Court
has overturned or distinguished some of its precedents, and has
upheld state legislation where some of the traditional preemptive factors were clearly present.
Foremost among these cases is New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino, which involved the federal
program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).'"
Under federal law, employable individuals who qualified for
AFDC could be required to participate in the Work Incentive
Program (WIN), which trained aid recipients for employment.
Because the WIN program could not accomodate the large
numbers of recipients eligible to participate, New York established a similar program and conditioned AFDC eligibility on
cooperation with its program." Thus, New York added an eligibility requirement to the federal program. The state program
was challenged on the grounds that it was preempted by the
federal WIN program. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, specifically repudiating an argument that Congress had
given such detailed and comprehensive coverage to problems
of assistance to the poor, that it could be inferred that Congress
left no room for concurrent regulations. Instead, the Court
found the two programs complementary" and reasoned that
where federal and state efforts combine in pursuit of common
goals the case for federal preemption is less persuasive than in
situations involving conflict. 3 Further, the Court demanded a
greater showing of congressional intent, making it more difficult to rely on traditional criteria which gave rise to an implied
preemption. In the words of the Court:
If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It will not be presumed that a
48. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117
(1973); New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
49. For a thorough discussion of this trend, see Note, The Preemption Doctrine:
Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623
(1975).
50. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
51. Id. at 406-09.
52. Id. at 418-22.
53. Id. at 421.
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federal statute was intended to supercede the exercise of
state power unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not
lightly to be presumed. 4
Taken at face value, this logic would virtually eliminate implied preemption.55
Several additional cases have reinforced the approach
5
taken in Dublino. For example, in Goldstein v. California," the
Court permitted California to grant copyright protection to
records and tapes. In reaching this decision, the Court found
that the copyright clause of the Constitution5" did not preempt
California from doing so and stated that preemption would
only be found if the matter was "necessarily national" in character and if conflicts from concurrent regulation "will necessarily arise."5 The language of Goldsteinsuggests a new and more
difficult test, one that will allow considerable concurrent regulation.59
Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware"° also
reflects the approach outlined in Dublino. Indeed, Ware involved an actual conflict between a federal and a California
statute relating to arbitration clauses contained in employment contracts. The Court considered the conflict insubstan54. Id. at 413 (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)).
55. In a later case, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the Burger Court again
rejected a claim of implied preemption based upon the theory that Congress had
occupied the field because of its detailed treatment of the subject. In De Canas, a
California law prohibiting an employer from hiring illegal aliens was held not to have
been preempted by congressional legislation on immigration.
56. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
57. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.8.
58. 412 U.S. at 553-55.
59. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), the Court concluded
that state trade secret laws did not conflict with federal patent law. This case involved
former employees of the plaintiff corporation who, after signing agreements not to
compete with it, formed their own corporation in competition with the plaintiff. Being
former employees, they had access to trade secrets of the plantiff corporation which
they utilized. Hearing an appeal from a successful action by the plaintiff corporation,
the court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that the state trade secret laws conflicted with federal patent laws. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that trade secret laws do not impede the purposes of the patent laws (encouraging
invention and public disclosure of inventions).
60. 414 U.S. 117 (1973). An employee of a business regulated by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh (1970 & Supp. V 1975), resigned to work
for a competitor. Under his prior employment contract, he forfeited certain benefits.
A California statute voided the clause in the employment contract. However, a New
York Stock Exchange Rule required arbitration of the contract. There was also a
California statute voiding arbitration clauses in certain wage disputes.
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tial and not related to the purposes of the federal statute,
whereas the California statute reflected a strong state interest.
This type of balancing approach to preemption had been expressly disapproved in an earlier decision." Ware illustrates the
Court's greater tolerance of state regulation even in situations
involving actual or potential conflict. Taken as a whole, this
series of cases can be seen as limiting those instances in which
the traditional factors of implied preemption will be utilized to
force state regulation to give way. In the absence of an express
statement by Congress to preempt a particular field or a direct
conflict with an important purpose of a federal regulatory
scheme, the state regulatory program will probably be upheld.
Traditional Criteriaand Nuclear Power
There have been two major decisions dealing directly with
the issue of federal preemption in the context of state attempts
to regulate nuclear power. The cases achieved diverse results
and both serve to indicate the complexity of the preemption
issue in the area of nuclear energy regulation.
Bodega Head & Harbor.In the first case, Northern California Association to Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor, Inc. v.
Public Utilities Commission, 2 Pacific Gas and Electric Company filed an application for permission from the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to build a nuclear powerplant at Bodega Bay, prior to seeking approval from the AEC. As part of
the PUC approval procedure public hearings were held, where
environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club, opposed the
proposed plant. However, the opponents claimed that they
were hampered in their presentation and that not all safety
issues were adequately discussed. The PUC eventually unanimously approved the powerplant. The environmental groups
repeatedly petitioned for new hearings, but the PUC rejected
their requests. The environmental groups then filed a petition
for a writ of review with the California Supreme Court challenging the PUC's decision. 3
After accepting the writ, the first issue faced by the court
61. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
62. 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964). Bodega Bay is in
California, north of San Francisco.
63. There were no lower court dispositions since, upon denial of the motion for a
new hearing by the PUC, the environmental groups petitioned directly to the California Supreme Court.
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was whether the question of the safety of the location of nuclear
reactors was controlled by federal law. In concluding that Congress had not preempted this field, the court relied on the language of the 1959 amendments. 4 The court made no attempt
to analyze the amendments' legislative history, rather it simply
cited section 274(a) to show the congressional purpose to establish cooperation between federal and state governments; to
clarify the respective responsibilities of each, while recognizing
the legitimate interests of the state in regulating nuclear
power; and finally to establish a state regulatory system for less
hazardous nuclear activities. Then the court cited section
274(k) for the proposition that the states retained power to
regulate nuclear powerplants for nonradiation concerns. Based
on the language of these two sections, the court reasoned that
at
the PUC could regulate the location of nuclear powerplants,
65
hazards.
radiation
with
concerned
not
least where it was
By implication, the California Supreme Court has concluded that states may not consider radiation hazards in making land use decisions about nuclear powerplants. To that extent the decision has made it more difficult to uphold the recently enacted California statutes. While the new statutes may
be distinguishable, they may arguably run afoul of this decision
by conditioning future nuclear development within the state on
advances in nuclear tenchology."
Northern States Power. By far the most significant and
oft-quoted decision in the area of nuclear preemption is
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,7 which was decided
by the Eighth Circuit in 1971 and summarily affirmed by the
Supreme Court in 1972. The facts of the case are fairly straightforward. In 1969, Northern applied to the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency for a permit to operate a nuclear facility. Before issuing a permit, Minnesota required compliance with regulations which limited the amount of radiation which could
escape from a powerplant. They dealt with the same type of
emissions that are the subject of AEC regulations, however,
64. 61 Cal. 2d at 133, 390 P.2d at 204, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 436. The section cited by
the court was 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a), (k).
65. Id. The California Supreme Court ruled against the environmental groups
because it found that they had waited too long before filing for a rehearing and let the
statutory time period pass. The court also ruled that, regardless, the PUC had not
abused its discretion in denying a rehearing. Id. at 134-36, 390 P.2d at 204-06, 37 Cal.
Rptr. at 436-38.
66. See text accompanying notes 25-33 supra.
67. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
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Minnesota's regulations were much more stringent.
In 1971, the AEC granted an operating license to Northern.
Northern then sought a declaratory judgment in the federal
district court to the effect that the State of Minnesota was
preempted from regulating radiation emission standards. The
district court found that the Atomic Energy Act, as amended
in 1959, expressly preempted state regulation on radiation hazards." The court of appeals affirmed the district court, but on
the ground of implied, not express, preemption. The court analyzed the Atomic Energy Act and its amendments and concluded that a congressional intent to preempt could be gathered from the Act as amended without any resort to legislative
history."
Additionally, the appellate court analyzed the history of
the Act, as originally enacted in 1946, noting that it mandated
complete federal control and ownership of nuclear facilities.
The court then observed that in 1954, Congress had provided
for a turnover of ownership of nuclear facilities to private entities, but only under strict federal control. The court pointed
out that no grant of power was given to the states to regulate
these privately owned power companies and that therefore all
regulatory power remained with the federal government. It was
only through the 1959 amendments, the court argued, that the
states received any regulatory capacity at all over nuclear activities.o Under this view, no power was taken from the states
by the 1959 amendments. The states were merely permitted to
share a previously exclusive federal power.'
68. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 320 F. Supp. 172, 179 (D. Minn.
1970), afJ'd, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
69. 447 F.2d at 1148-50. In analyzing the statutes, the court examined sections
274(a), 274(b), 274(c), and 274(k) of the Act. Looking at section 274(a), 42 U.S.C. §
2021(a) (Supp. V 1975), the court observed that the purpose of the Act, at least in part,
was to allow the AEC to turn over its regulatory power to the states pursuant to
agreements to that effect. The court then noted that construction and operation of
nuclear powerplants are not among the categories of activities for which section 274(b),
id. § 2021(b), authorizes such agreements and that section 274(c), id. § 2021(c), specifically names nuclear powerplants as an activity not to be turned over to state regulation. The court ruled out concurrent jurisdiction by reference to section 274(k), id. §
2021(k), which allows states to regulate any activity for purposes other than protection
from radiation hazards, thereby implying states cannot regulate for radiation hazards
without an agreement.
70. 447 F.2d at 1149-50.
71. The court utilized the wording of the amendments to show that the states
previously had no regulatory power and acquired only that power which the AEC had
delegated to them. To support this outlook, the court quoted portions of section 274(b):
[Dluring the duration of such agreement it is recognized that the state
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The court concluded that only regulation of nuclear energy
which was motivated by concerns apart from radiation was
exempt from preemption and that no regulation of radiation
hazards by the states was contemplated absent an agreement
with the AEC. Minneosta, therefore, had no authority to establish its own radiation emission standards.
Unlike the Bodega Head & Harbor decision, the court of
appeals in Northern States buttressed its opinion with an extensive examination of the legislative history of the Act and its
amendments."2 The language of the opinion persuasively argues
that nuclear power, by its nature, requires uniform national
regulation." This language could have broad preemptive implications.
The exact impact of the Northern States decision on the
California statutes is difficult to predict. However, it is certain
that the decision makes preemption more likely. If the reasoning and conclusions are accepted fully, then the California statutes would almost certainly be preempted. However, the facts
of Northern States can be distinguished. Minnesota was regulating the actual operation of nuclear powerplants by setting its
own radiation standards. California however, is not regulating
the internal operation of nuclear powerplants. Instead, California is withholding land use until three conditions are met, none
of which relate to radiation standards.
. On the other hand, the rationale of Northern States may
fit the California statutes, because the state legislature appears
shall have authority to regulate the materials covered by the agreement
for the protection of the public health and safety from radiation hazards.
42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (Supp. V 1975). The emphasized wording is supposed to illustrate
that the 1959 amendments gave only a limited grant of power and that the state had
no inherent authority. The court of appeals also cited section 274(c), id. § 2021(c),
which states that the AEC cannot turn over to the states its power to regulate, among
other things, nuclear powerplants, and section 274(k), id. § 2021(k), which states that
nothing in section 274, id. § 2021, shall be construed to affect state authority to
regulate nuclear powerplants for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. 447 F.2d at 1149.
72. The court of appeals quoted at length from S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1959), reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2872. [hereinafter
cited without parallel citation as SENATE REPORT]. See 447 F.2d at 1151-52.
73. See 447 F.2d at 1153-54. If one assumes that Congress has vested the AEC
with the sole power to balance nuclear safety against the nation's energy needs, then
virtually all state regulation of nuclear powerplants with nuclear safety as a goal is
preempted. Critics of nuclear power are usually most concerned about the safety aspects. Proponents, in addition to giving assurances of the safety of nuclear powerplants, generally cite the nation's growing need for energy. If states cannot consider
these two factors in regulating nuclear power, they are then virtually eliminated from
the controversy.
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to have balanced the public safety against the need for the
development of new energy sources. That is precisely the balance which Northern States ruled was within the exclusive
74
domain of the AEC.
As has been noted, a string of recent United States Supreme Court cases suggests a move toward allowing greater
concurrent regulation between state and federal governments.7 5
Therefore, it cann6t be assumed that the Supreme Court will
accept the Northern States outlook in future litigation. While
it is true that the United States Supreme Court summarily
affirmed the Northern States decision, two factors tend to negate the importance of that fact. First, while a summary affirmance is technically an adjudication on the merits, in reality
it is little more than a refusal to hear the case.76 Second, the
previously discussed new preemption cases were decided after
the summary affirmance of the Northern States decision.
0
THE CALIFORNIA STATUTES AND PREEMPTION

Background
In examining the question of preemption, it is important
to remember two points. First, the California statutes have the
effect of banning all nuclear powerplants which are not specifically exempted until the three conditions prescribed by the
statutes exist.77 Second, the objective of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 was to further the development of nuclear power consistent with the general welfare.7" It has been argued that Congress intended that any state action which impedes the spread
of nuclear power necessarily frustrates the objectives of the Act
74. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 48-61 supra.
76. The California Supreme Court has stated, "It has often been observed
that
the dismissal of an appeal, technically an adjudication on the merits, is in
practice
often the substantial equivalent of a denial of certiorari." Serrano v. Priest,
5 Cal. 3d
584, 616, 487 P.2d 1241, 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 624 (1971) (quoting D. Currie,
The
Three-Judge District Court in ConstitutionalLitigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,
74 n.365
(1964)). In deciding whether to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari, the
primary
consideration is whether the case is of general interest or would resolve conflicts
between intermediate reviewing courts. R.L. STERN & U. GRESSMAN, SUPREME
COURT
PRACTICE 154, 167 (4th ed. 1969).
77. See text accompanying notes 25-33 supra. It will be remembered that
the
three conditions are the existence of technology for reprocessing of fuel, permanent
storage of wastes, and the completion of a study on undergrounding nuclear
powerplants by the ERCDC.
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER

19781

and is preempted." If this congressional intent argument is
accepted, the effect would be to preempt all state laws, such
as California's, excluding or significantly limiting the spread of
nuclear power.
If it is accepted that the states are not preempted from
excluding or impeding the development of nuclear powerplants, the question remains whether they may do so out of
concern for radiation hazards. As discussed previously, the
conditions imposed by the California statutes seem to reflect a
concern for radiation hazards."0 However, there is also evidence
that the economic reliability of nuclear powerplants was a factor in their passage.8 ' It will be recalled that the language of the
1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act strongly implies
that a state may regulate nuclear energy, subject to an agreement with the AEC, only for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards.8 "
State Power to Regulate Nuclear Energy
To answer the question whether states are free to establish
regulations that may directly or indirectly impede the development of nuclear energy it is necessary to examine the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 to determine if Congress exhibited an express or implied intent to preempt the area. Interestingly, a
close look at the 1954 Act suggests that Congress did not even
consider the impact it might have on the states. There is nothing in the Act which indicates a congressional intent to force
3
nuclear power upon the states.1 Also, in two hundred hours of
debate, the Senate never directly addressed the effect of the
8
Act on state power over land use. " Apart from the obvious
possibility that the state-federal controversy did not exist at
the time due to the lack of proliferation of nuclear technology,
this silence probably reflects the fact that the congressional
purpose was not very ambitious. Arguably, the purpose of the
79. See Note, Application of the Preemption Doctrine to State Laws Affecting
Nuclear Power Plants, 62 VA. L. REv. 738, 778-79 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
80. See text accompanying notes 25-33 supra.

81.

See

REASSESSMENT REPORT,

supra note 2, at 154-55. The report mentions how

California Public Resources Code sections 25524.1 and 25524.2 would serve to resolve
problems concerning the fuel cycle. An inadequate fuel cycle results in less reliable and
more expensive sources of fuel.
82. See text accompanying notes 12-18, 62-66 supra.
83. Lemov, State and Local Control over the Location of Nuclear Reactorsunder
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1008, 1011 (1964).
84. See id. at 1017.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

Act was simply to provide for private development of the then
nonexistent nuclear power industry without regard to conflicts
which might occur in the future. This view is borne out by an
address given by the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congressman Sterling Cole, in which he stated
that the problem of future ground rules for a then fledgling
atomic power industry was not before the Congress. s5 Further,
Congressman Cole noted that the purpose of the legislation was
to get the nuclear power industry on its feet."6 In 1954 then, it
seems clear that it was not the express intent of Congress to
displace the general power of the soverign states to control their
own land use in regard to nuclear powerplants.
Developments since 1954 also tend to support the view
that the nuclear power industry is subject to some state control. The 1959 amendments to the Act, concerning the regulation of radiation hazards, do not displace the states' power to
regulate so long as the state bases its decisions on the development of nuclear power on factors other than radiation hazards. 7 Similarly, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 emphasized a "go slow" attitude towards the development of nuclear energy as exemplified by its splitting of the developmental and regulatory functions of the AEC. Additionally, the 1974
Act contains the following proviso: "Congress intends that all
possible sources of energy be developed consistent with warranted priorities. ' 'ss This cautious statement again illustrates
the congressional unwillingness to perceive the 1954 Act as a
mandate to spread nuclear power into every state.
In light of the foregoing analysis, it seems unlikely that
state laws which directly or indirectly deny land use to nuclear
powerplants are preempted by a congressional policy in favor
of spreading the use of nuclear energy. However, the question
remains whether such a denial can be founded on a state regu85. Congressman Cole stated:
Several years from now, I presume that the Congress will be required to
stake out the ground rules for an atomic power industry-to set forth the
terms and conditions under which the American people will enjoy the
benefits of electric power developed from nuclear sources. That problem
however, is not the concern of the bills now before the Joint Committee.
I emphasize with all the force of my command that the problem before
us in 1954 is not the formulation of federal policy for a non-existent
atomic power industry.
Id. at 1018.
86. Id.
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1970); text accompanying note 18 supra.
88. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5801(b) (Supp. V 1975).
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lation concerned with radiation hazards. To answer this question one must turn to the 1959 amendments, the only portion
of the federal regulatory program that addresses the problem
of state-federal relations.
State Regulation Based on Radiation Hazards
At the outset, the scope of the four relevant subparts of
section 274 of the 1959 amendments should be reexamined.
Section 274(a) establishes a congressional purpose to define
state and federal roles in regulating nuclear power. It also
states a purpose to turn over certain AEC functions to the
states. 9 Section 274(b) allows the AEC to turn over to the
states its regulatory authority over certain nuclear activities
which present low level health risks.9" Section 274(c) prohibits
the AEC from releasing its authority over more hazardous activities including nuclear powerplants.9' Finally, section 274(k)
says that nothing in the statute should be read so as to take
away state authority to regulate nuclear activitities for purposes other than protection from radiation hazards."
Section 274(k) clearly implies that the states may not regulate nuclear powerplants in the area of radiation protection.
However, the express language of the statute is insufficient to
guage those types of state regulation that are actually
preempted.93 The report of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, accompanying the legislation provides a more meaningful interpretation of precisely what types of regulations are
involved.94 It indicates that the primary reason for not transferring power to the states to regulate radiation hazards is the
concern for public safety. This concern was prompted by the
states' lack of technical expertise to regulate some of the more
hazardous aspects of nuclear energy.95 The report quotes from
a letter received by then AEC General Manager, A.R. Luedecke, in which he explained the purpose of an AEC sponsored
bill with provisions similar to the bill that eventually passed:
Essentially, the objectives of this proposed bill are to provide procedures and criteria whereby the Commission may
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

42 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1970).
Id.§ 2021(b).
Id. § 2021(c).
Id. § 2021(k); see text accompanying note 19 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (Supp. III 1973).
SENATE REPORT, supra note 72, at 6.
Id.
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"turn over" to individual States, as they become ready,
certain defined areas of regulatory jurisdiction ...
[C]ertain areas would be excluded because the technical
safety considerationsare of such complexity that it is not
likely that any state would be prepared to deal with them
during the foreseeable future."
Significantly, the report also stated that the amendments of
1959 were not intended as the final word on allocation of federal
and state responsibility." The amendments were seen as transitionary measures and the intent was to enact further legislation giving the states more authority as state expertise in-

creased."
Against the backdrop of the legislative history, it seems

clear that lack of state expertise was the primary reason for
limiting state responsibilities under the Act. Consequently,
states should be free to regulate nuclear powerplants in those

areas which do not involve technical expertise, particularly

when the contemplated state action may increase the public
safety. Similarly, it is arguable that those states which have
acquired the requisite technical expertise, based on an agreement with the AEC, should be free to regulate even in the area
of radiation protection. If the expertise exists, the caution

which prompted the passage of section 274(k) is no longer a

legitimate rationale for denying a state the freedom to regulate.
Even if the federal government retains the power to control
the construction and operation of nuclear powerplants, it can
be contended that this does not necessarily preempt the states'
96. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
97. In the following passage of the report of the Joint Committee, states are
encouraged to increase their expertise in order to be ready for such future legislation:
"The bill recognizes that this is interim legislation. The committee believes that the
uses of atomic energy will be so widespread in future years that States should continue
to prepare themselves for increased responsibilities." Id. at 9. It should be noted that
the reference to increased use is not a policy statement. It is phrased as a prediction
rather than as a declaration of policy. The passage as a whole does emphasize that
state expertise was the primary consideration, as does the following passage taken from
the analysis portion of the report: "The purpose, as redrafted by the committee, also
provides for coordination of the development of radiation standards . . . and recognizes that this is interim legislation in that, as the states improve their capabilities,
additional legislation may be needed, perhaps in approximately 5 years." Id. (emphasis added).
98. This designation of the 1959 amendments as interim legislation is specifically
expressed in the amendment at section 274(a)(6), which provides that one of the
purposes of section 274 is to "recognize that, as the States improve their capabilities
to regulate effectively such materials, additional legislation may be desirable." 42
U.S.C. § 2021(a)(6) (1970).
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power to deny land use to powerplants.1 Denial of land use is
a policy decision made by legislators which does not require the
technical expertise necessary to regulate the construction and
operation of nuclear powerplants. Additionally, a state's decision to grant or deny land use to nuclear powerplants can be
viewed as a condition precedent to the commencement of activities which are regulated by the federal government.' °" Thus,
even if section 274(k) is read to preempt state regulation of
radiation hazards, it should have no effect on state laws that
merely deny land use, regardless of their reason for so doing.
State Regulation Based on California Model
The California Public Resources Code purports to deny
land use to nuclear powerplants in the event any one of three
circumstances exists: there is no technology permitting the
construction and operation of nuclear fuel rod reprocessing
plants; or there is no technology permitting the disposal of
nuclear waste; or there is no effective way to permit the underground containment of nuclear reactors.''
Argument for preemption. Basicly, an argument contending that the California regulatory scheme is preempted would
begin with the rationale of the Northern States decision. This
case assumed that atomic energy is federally controlled and
that in 1954, when private utilities were given certain rights,
99. See generally Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th
Cir. 1971), a/'d, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
100. On this point, the Joint Committee defined the word "regulate" to include
licensing:
Amendment No. 1, in subsection b., strikes out the words "and license"
after the word "regulate." The words "and license" were not considered
necessary because, as used elsewhere in the bill, the word "regulate"
includes the licensing function. Thus, for reasons of consistency, the
words "and license" in this subsection were deleted as being unnecessary.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 72, at 2. Since one aspect of licensing under the AEC
licensing procedure is approving the site of nuclear powerplants, it is perhaps arguable
that exclusion is a licensing procedure which is preempted. However, licensing involves
a very technical analysis of the site and the proposed plant. In addition, licensing
involves many things other than site approval. The entire design and operation of the
proposed plant is checked. It includes all the AEC regulation which occurs prior to
actual commencement of operations. A state decision to deny land use seems very
unlike the technical procedure called "licensing." Also, the word "regulate" has connctations of monitoring and controlling on-going activities. Such monitoring and controlling call for expertise and this interpretation comports with the legislative history.
Thus, it is unlikely that "regulate" was intended to refer to denials of land use.
101. See text accompanying notes 25-33 supra.
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no express grant of power was made to the states to regulate
nuclear energy. 02 The argument would then turn to the 1959
amendments to the Act which imply that the states had no
regulatory power over nuclear energy apart from that delegated
by the AEC. Moreover, the 1959 amendments explicitly suggest that states could not regulate nuclear powerplants out of
concern for radiation hazards. Therefore, since California is
attempting to deny land use to nuclear powerplants based on
reasons relating to radiation hazards, and since this denial is a
form of regulation, the California scheme is impliedly preempted.
Argument against preemption. Though the preceding argument is conceptually sound it ignores some of the realities
surrounding federal regulatory power in general and the nuclear regulatory program in particular. First, state police power
exists of its own right since states are governments of general
powers. Unless preempted, they have the power to regulate
activities within their borders. 1 3 With the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, private companies were allowed to
own and develop nuclear reactors. Since private companies are
not protected by sovereign immunity, states should be free to
regulate them under their police power, unless a congressional
preemptive intent can be found to the contrary. As noted earlier, no such intent existed with the passage of the Act in 1954;
Congress did not even consider the federal-state problem.'04 In
1959, preemptive intent did emerge with respect to radiation
hazards, however such preemptive intent has never been shown
with regard to state laws denying land use to nuclear powerplants. Even as to radiation hazards, the concerns which supported the passage of section 274(k) are largely absent when
applied to a state like California, which possesses the expertise
to regulate all facets of nuclear power.
Second, the argument for implied preemption is weakened
by the fact that the federal regulatory program is simply not
a very ambitious one. It is only in the relatively complex areas
of construction and operation that the program takes on a pervasive quality. However, in areas not requiring technical expertise this quality is absent. Thus, state decisions which require
no technical expertise-such as to have no powerplants or to
102.

103.
104.

447 F.2d at 1150.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See text accompanying notes 93-98 supra.
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restrict their number-should not be preempted, regardless of
the reasons behind the ban or restriction. Only a complex federal scheme of energy production priorities could provide a
colorable basis for implied preemption of state laws that ban
or restrict the development of nuclear energy. This would indicate a congressional intent to carry nuclear energy to every
state. Until such a scheme exists, the only areas which should
be preempted are the construction of new nuclear powerplants
which a state is willing to permit the operation of those plants
which now exist.
In the wake of this two-pronged attack on the argument for
implied preemption, California's regulatory approach should
survive. It does not purport to affect existing nuclear facilities,
nor does it purport to regulate those which might be constructed out of concern for radiation hazards. The California
approach simply attempts to apply the state's inherent police
power to the spread of nuclear energy within its borders. This
conclusion also finds support in the recent Supreme Court decisions allowing concurrent regulation without preemption.
CONCLUSION

California's legislative effort to regulate activity related to
nuclear power within its borders has created a classic problem
of federal preemption. This problem exists on two levels. One
level presupposes that the purpose of the Atomic Energy Act
was to develop nuclear energy as a national energy source to be
used in every state and that state legislation interfering with
that goal is preempted. However, the language of the Act itself
and its legislative history simply do not contain evidence of
such a broad congressional purpose.
The second level of the problem assumes that states have
retained limited power to regulate nuclear power within their
borders, but questions whether they can regulate to protect
against radiation hazards. This issue is important both because
the California statutes reflect a concern for radiation hazards
and the 1959 amendments to the Act imply that states are not
permitted to regulate in this area. However, an examination of
the legislative history of the amendments reveals that nuclear
powerplants were exempted from state regulation because of
concern that states did not then possess sufficient expertise to
regulate the complex activity of constructing and operating
nuclear powerplants. It can be argued that this concern does
not logically extend to preempt state statutes, such as Califor-
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nia's, that merely deny land use to nuclear powerplants, since
this denial does not call for extensive expertise and is not regulation within the meaning of the amendments. Under this view,
California's statutes could be upheld.
Jos6 Mata

